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Abstract 
 
In the natural context of wireless network environment, 
the  communications  between  wireless  nodes  are  more 
easily  observed  for  the  goal  of  the  network  traffic 
analysis.  Thus,  to  enable  a  secure  and  anonymous 
communication system from thwarting of such analysis 
attacks would be strongly desirable. In this paper, we 
propose a secure and anonymous communication system 
using pairing-based group signatures. The achievement 
of secure and anonymous communication is performed 
by  allowing  all  valid  member  wireless  nodes  of  a 
particular  privilege  group  to  authenticate  each  other 
without revealing their own identities. 
 
Keywords: group signature, anonymity, signer, verifier, 
wireless networks, authentication. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Recently,  there  are  numerous  ubiquitous  services 
growing rapidly along with the advancement of personal 
computer,  laptop,  smart  phone,  and  other  embedded 
devices.  Almost  services  require  an  authentication  or 
identification for accessing control and authorization. As 
the result the accessed services by a user can be linked 
and  tracked,  hence  the  system  obtained  the  user 
preference access history. One of user-privacy problem 
solving in the privacy-preserving authentication systems 
is the use of group signature, since it is very practical and 
able  to  provide  not  only  the  anonymity,  but  also 
unlinkability and untraceability. 
Group signature is a kind of digital signature based 
on public key (one is given to a privilege group, not to 
one user). The group signature was introduced by Chaum 
and  Heyst  [13]  for  the  first  time.  Currently,  group 
signature  also  becomes  one  of  the  main  topics  in  the 
cryptographic technology and many researchers actively 
have been taking in account such topic of interest [2–9]. 
The  group  signature  scheme  allows  the  users  to  sign 
messages  without  revealing  their  own  privacy 
information (i.e.  identity).  In case  of misuses or  other 
reasons, there is an authority called group manager (GM) 
can  trace  the  signer.  Many  applications  of  group 
signaturealso have been proposed and studied [6, 9]. In 
this paper, we consider the use of  group signature for 
communication protocol in the wireless mobile networks 
such  that  able  to  provide  a  secure  and  anonymous 
communication. 
Again,  in  the  current  era  of  pervasive  computing, 
where ubiquitous services  exist as an integrated part of 
our  environment  settings.  Thus,  computers,  handhelds, 
gadgets,  and  other  mobile  devices  are  going  to 
beexchanging  messages  nodes  with  each  other  (e.g., 
wireless  networks,  sensor  networks,  vehicle-2-vehicle 
communications  [6,  9–11]).  To  satisfy  these  systems 
requirement  such  that  they  are  able  to  work  properly, 
every  messagehas  todeliverthe  most  important 
information  of  authentication.  However,the  system 
requirements  on  the  authentication  are  depend  on  any 
cryptographic solution. Ideally, such requirements should 
fulfill the following matters simultaneously: 
a.  Low bandwidth consumption: that due to the limited 
spectrum available for wireless communication, sensor 
network,  and  vehicular  communication.  Thus,  a 
mechanism  to  achieve  any  shorter  than  RSA 
signatures  is  needed  (i.e.,  shorter  signature  size, 
shorter  processing  time,  shorter  bit-length,  lower 
power consumption). 
b.  Fast verification for large numbers of messages from 
different  sources:  that  due  to  the  suggestion  of 
[12]whereas  the  safety  message  re-transmission  of 
vehicles  is  done  every  300ms  to  all  other  vehicles 
within 110 meters of a minimum range. This means 
that  it  is  much  more  critical    in  the  authentication 
phase. Therefore, it is better if the verification process 
is faster than generation process. 
c.  Privacy-friendly  or  anonymity:  that  due  to  users-
privacy  information  should  be  protected  from  the 
information involved for every authentication process. 
 
One  of  applications  requiring  group  signatures  in 
wireless network implementation for IEEE802.1X-based 
wireless protocol [6] showed the effectiveness of using 
group  signature  to  achieve  a  user-privacy  enhancing 
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revocation group signature [7] such that it is to be easily 
and  efficiently  adopted  and  applied  for  anonymous 
authentication  in  the  IEEE802.1X-based  wireless 
communication  protocol.  However,  due  to  the  group 
signature  scheme  considered  the  user  revocation 
function,    it  suffered    from  the  number  of  revoked 
users. Another application of using group signature is the 
application for cloud computing environment [9] which 
involves  mobile  devices,  sensor  networks,  embedded 
systems,  etc.  This  work  investigatedthe  differences 
between group signatures and ECC for client devices and 
servers in cloud computing technology by introducing a 
modified existing High-Level Synthesis in order can be 
adapted with group signature implementation into FPGA 
board hardware. 
In this paper, we propose a light-weight and simple 
scheme of  group  signature  from  short  group  signature 
scheme (BBS signature) [2] in order  to  be easily  and 
efficiently applied for wireless mobile networks, sensor 
networks, and other ubiquitous devices communication 
protocol. 
 
2. Previous Works 
Digital  signatureshave  overhead  computation 
time.Thus, researchers have  tried to  find out alternative 
protocols  designed  to  suitable  signatures  over  many 
packets.  The  desirable  signatures  require  verifiers  to 
acquire many packets before verifying. Other approaches 
including  the  shortsignatures  are  inappropriate  for  the 
spread-settings,  because  verification  process  requires 
interaction with the signer frequently. 
In  2001,  BLS  signature  [3]  was  developed.  The 
scheme is based  on a pairing-based  group  signature  in 
170-bit length that provides the same security level with 
1024-bit  RSA.  Thediscovery  was  followed  by  many 
researchers to achieve more efficient signature schemes. 
As  the  result  of  advancement,  many  signature  variants 
have been proposed, some of  them are privacy-friendly 
and shorter group signatures [2, 4, 5, 7, 8]. 
BBS signatures [2] is a short group signature scheme 
based on a non-interactive zero-knowledge protocol for 
Strong  Diffie-Hellman  (SDH)  and  Decision  Linier 
assumptions in the bilinear pairing groups. The scheme 
employees a bilinear map, :    ×    →   . The group     
has  a  short  representation  and  the  length  of  group 
signature is under 200 bytes. Meanwhile, the advantages 
of this scheme are the signature generation that requires 
no bilinear pairing computation, the verification requires a 
single  pairing,  and  both  signature  generation  and 
verification need a few exponentiations. Therefore, based 
on BBS signature, we consider adopting the scheme for 
our  secure  and  anonymous  wireless  network 
communication protocol and its implementation. 
 
 
 
3. Bilinear Groups and Complexity Assumption 
Firstly,  we  describe  the  concept  related  to  bilinear 
maps.  The  bilinear  map  notation  can  be  defined  as 
follows: 
a.    and     are  two  multiplicative  cyclic  groups  of 
prime order   . 
b.    is a generator of      and      is a generator of    . 
c.  φ  is a computable isomorphism from    to      by the 
isomorphism function  φ(  ) =   ; and 
d.      is  a  computable  map, :    ×    →    with  the 
following properties: 
 Bilinearity:  for  all   ∈   ,  ∈    and   ,  ∈   , 
where (  ,  ) =  ( , )  . 
 Non-degeneracy:  e(  ,  ) ≠ 1. 
 
Secondly,  we  use  the  following  assumptions  for  the 
security requirements. 
a.  Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption. 
Let      and      be  cyclic  groups  of  prime  order  p. 
There is possibility that     =   .  Let  be a generator 
of    and      is a generator of    . 
 
q-StrongDiffie-Hellman  Problem  (q-SDH):  The  q-
SDH problem in (  ,  ) is defined as follows: 
Given  a  (q+2)-tuple (  ,  ,  
 ,  
    ,…,  
(  )) as 
input, and the output is a pair (  
( /(   )), x), where x 
∈  
∗. An algorithm Ahas advantage  ∊  in solving q-
SDH in (  ,  )if 
 
         ,  ,  
 ,…,  
(  )  = (  
 
   , )  ≥∈. 
 
Where  the  probability  is  over  the  random  choice  of 
generator      in      of  γin  
∗, and of the random bits of 
A. 
 
b.  Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman Assumption. 
By  using    in    as  above,  along  with  arbitrary 
generators u, v, and hof    , consider the following: 
 
Decision Linear Problem in    : Given u, v, u
a, v
b, h
c 
in      as  input,  the  output  isyesifa+   =     orno 
otherwise. 
More  precisely,  the  definition  of  the  advantage 
algorithmA in deciding the Decision Linear problem in 
  is as: 
Adv Linear  =    
     
 ( , ,ℎ,  ,  ,ℎ   ) =    
:  , ,ℎ ←   , ,  ←   
 
−    
 ( , ,ℎ,  ,  , ) =     
:  , ,  ←   , ,  ←   
 
    
 
The probability is over the uniform random choice of 
the parameters to A, and over the coin tosses of A. 
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4.  Light-Weight  Group  Signature  Scheme  for 
Wireless Networks 
Firstly,  we  review  the  security  requirements  of 
communication protocol. Secondly, we review the BBS 
short  group  signature  as  our  adoption  scheme  in  the 
proposed communication protocol. Finally, in details we 
describe the four phases: KeyGeneration (KeyGen) phase, 
Registration  phase,  Authentication  phase,  and  Tracing 
phase in our proposed communication protocol. The first 
phase is for generating public and secret parameters. The 
second phase is the user or wireless nodesregistration to the 
group  manager  authority  andobtaining  some  secret 
information  used  for  authentication  process.  The  third 
phase is  for wireless node authentication  to each other. 
One node acts as the signer and another will act as the 
verifier. The signer generates his group signature and the 
verifier verifies the  signer’s  signature  to  prove  that the 
signer is a legitimate user without revealing any privacy 
information of signer. The fourth phase is for the GM to 
trace the user about his history records. 
 
4.1 Security Requirements   
Some  security  requirements  of  secure  and 
anonymous communication protocol are listed as follows. 
 
User anonymity: No one can identify the user or wireless 
nodes. 
Unlinkability: There are two or more signatures, no one 
can distinguish whether these signatures are related or 
not. 
Untraceability: No one can trace user’s records. The goal 
is  protecting  user’s  privacy,  which  means  that  the 
identity  and  related  secret  information  of  the  user 
cannot be revealed. 
Unforgeability: no one except users of the group is able 
to generate a valid signature. 
Confidentiality:  Only  GM  can  obtain  user’s 
communication  history  through  the  Tracing 
mechanism.   
Integrity: No one can modify the message content.   
Authentication: The user  can request services  to other 
users or gateway for confirming the legitimacy of the 
user. 
 
4.2 BBS Short Group Signature 
Boneh et al. [2] proposed a short group signature scheme 
to hide signer’s identity in the signature by using linear 
encryption  based  on  decisional  linear  assumption.  The 
total signature length is 1533 bits or 192 bytes for the 
same security level with 1024-bit RSA. In this scheme, 
there are 3 players who involved in the system (see Fig. 
1): 
a.  Group Manager: it has an authority to issue the key 
(group public key  gpk =   ,  ,ℎ, , , )  and group 
secret key  gmsk = (  ,  ,γ), and also user’s private 
key pair) through a Setup algorithm and open signer’s 
identity through an Open algorithm. 
b.  User  or  signer:  the  entity  who  joins  the  group.  He 
signs a message to prove himself as a legitimate user 
anonymously using his private key  gsk[ ] = (  ,  ) 
issued by GM through Sign algorithm. 
c.  Verifier:  the  entity  who  verifies  user’s  signature  to 
check  whether  the  user  is  valid  user  or  not 
anonymously through Verify algorithm. 
 
 
 
Fig 1. Involved players and procedures in short group 
signature. 
 
The detail procedure of this scheme is as follows: 
a.  Setup: the GM selects secret key  gmsk = (  ,  ,γ) 
and  group  public  key  gpk = (  ,  ,ℎ, , , ),  where 
    =     = ℎ  and  w = ℎ .  While      and      are 
generators of the bilinear groups    and    . 
b.  Join: user selects his secret key     ∈    
∗  randomly. 
Then,  GM computes
    =   
 /(    )  and  sends      to 
user.    Here,    the  user    has  his    secret  key   
gsk[ ] = (  ,  ). 
c.  Sign    :    user    generates  a  group  signature   
σ = (  ,  ,  ,c,  ,  ,  ,   ,   )    for  the  message  M 
by    suing    his    secret    key.   
    =   ,    =   ,   =   ℎ   .  Here,     ,  ,and     
are linear encryption results for blinding    , and  β. 
Then, the user computes   
   ←    ,   ←  
  ,   ←
 (   ,  )  . (ℎ,w)
      . (ℎ,  )
        ,   ←
   
  . 
    ,   ←   
  . 
       
with random blinding values    ,  ,   ,   ,   . Also he 
computes  a  challenge 
  =    ℎ( ,   ,  ,  ,  ,…,  )   using  random 
numbers    ,  ,  ,   ,   which  are  the  values  for 
zero-knowledge proof of  (  ,  ). 
d.  Verify:  the  verifier  verifies  the  user’s  signature  on 
given  message    and 
signature σ = (  ,   ,  ,c,  ,  ,  ,   ,   ) ,  the 
verifier        computes     
 ,…,   
            such 
that    
  ←    .   
  ,   
  ←  
  .  
  ,   
  ←  
    .   
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  ←  
    .   
   ,  and 
   
  ←
 (  ,  )  . (ℎ,w)      .e(ℎ,  )
        .( (  , )/
 (  ,  )) .   
Then,    the  verifier  checks  if    c  is  equal  to 
 ′ =    ℎ(M,   ,  ,  ,   
 ,…   
 )   or  not.  The 
verification is successfulif    =  ′. 
e.  Open:    on  given  message      and  signature 
σ = (   ,   ,  ,c,  ,  ,  ,   ,   ),  the  GM  checks 
the validity of signature and opens the signer’s secret 
    as     =   /(   
  .   
  ),  if  the  signature  is  valid, 
then      is a part of signer as the signer identity. 
 
4.3 The Proposed Protocol 
The  proposed  protocol  is  based  on  the  BBS  short 
group signature [2] and the hash function technology. The 
detail procedureis described in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
Fig 2.Proposed communication protocol. 
 
We separated the authority of GM into two entities, Key 
Issuer  Manager  and  Tracing  Manager.  Key  Issuer 
Manager has the authority to issue group public key (gpk), 
group  secret  key  (gmsk),  tracing  key  (tsk),  and  user’s 
secret key usk[i] for the successful joining users. While 
the Tracing Manager has the authority to trace and open 
the user’s identity information from the user’s signature 
obtained  from the verifier (SP)  who requested  opening 
user’s  identity,  in  case  of  misuses  activities,  contract 
expiration date of services, or other reasons. We define 
our protocol procedures into 4 phases which are described 
in detail as follows: 
 
Phase 1: KeyGen Algorithm. 
This is the randomized algorithm with the input parameter 
is , the number of users of a privilege group. Then, the 
Key Issuer Managerproceeds the following steps: 
a.  Select a generator     ∈    uniformly at random. Set 
   ← φ(  ).  Select  ℎ ∈    ,  ,   ∈    
∗  and  set 
 ,  ∈     such that      =     = ℎ. 
b.  Select  γ ∈    
∗  and set    =   
 . 
c.  Select    ∈    and  s ∈    
∗. Then, compute  =   . 
d.  Output  the  group  public  key 
gpk = ( ,  ,  ,ℎ, , , , , ,  ,  , ), group 
secret key  gmsk = (  ,  ,γ), and the tracing secret 
key  tsk = ( ). 
e.  Distribute gpk and tsk to Tracing Manager. 
 
 
Phase 2: Registration Protocol. 
This  is  a  communication  protocol  between  Key  Issuer 
Manager  and  a  joining user. The  i-th user  joins to  the 
group by processing the following steps: 
a.  User  i  selects    ,  
  ∈    
∗ ,  and  computes     =
      
 
  and     =     .  Where  the  user’s  ID  is 
embedded into his secret key    . 
b.  User  i  sends  Key  Issuer  Manager(  and    ),  and 
proves  that     =       
 
  and     =       by  a 
signature proof of knowledge(SPK). Where SPK is 
performed  by  utilizing  Fiat-Shamir  heuristic  [14] 
conversion  signatures  using  a  hash  function  from 
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (PK) as well as 
in [2– 9], where a signer can convince a verifier of 
knowledge  by  relation  on  representations.  We  call 
such mechanism as signature PK’s or SPK. 
c.  Key  Issuer  Manager  selects   ,  
   ∈    
∗ ,  and 
computes     = (       
  
) /(    ) .  Then  the  Key 
Issuer  Manager  sends  (  ,  ,  
  )  to  user  i.  Key 
Issuer  Manager  adds  ( ,  ,  )  to  his  Group  List 
(GL),which is the database of users in the group. 
d.  Upon  receiving  (  ,  ,  
  ), useri  computes 
   =   
  +   
  , and outputs  usk[ ] = (  ,  ,  ,  ). 
 
 
Phase 3: Authentication Protocol. 
This is an authentication protocol between the signer 
and  the  verifier.  This  protocol  comprises  into  two 
algorithms, Sign algorithm and Verify algorithm. Detail 
descriptions of algorithms are described as follows: 
 
Signature generation: Sign Algorithm. 
This algorithm is performed by the user (signer) to 
authenticate himself to a verifier who acts as an SP for 
accessing services offered by verifier, where the inputs of 
signing algorithm are the group public key gpk, the signer 
secret key usk[i], and a signed message,  ∈ {0,1}∗. The 
algorithm is performed as follows: 
a.  Select  α,β ∈    
∗   and  set  µ = −   −    . Then, 
compute      =     and     =   . 
b.  Select    ∈    
∗. Compute      =   and      =      . 
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c.  The SPK X is computed as follows: 
  = SPK{(  ,  , , , , ): 
 (  ,  )
 (   , )
=  (   ,  )   ( ,  )    ( ,  )  ( , )   , 
        =   ,    =   ,    =      }( ). 
d.  Pick blinding factors:    ,   ,  ,  ,   ,   ∈    
∗. 
e.  Compute: 
   =  (   ,  )
    ( ,  )
     ( ,  )   ( , )   , 
   =  
  ,    =  
  ,    =  
      . 
f.  Compute a challenge    ∈    
∗  as: 
  =    ℎ(gpk, ,   ,  ,   ,   ,  ,  ,  ,  ). 
g.  Compute responses: 
    =     +    ,     =     +     ,    =     +  ,    =
   +   ,   =     +   ,   =     +     ∈   
∗  . 
h.  Output the group signature: 
σ = (   ,  ,   ,   , ,   ,   ,  ,  ,  ,  ). 
 
 
Signature verification: Verify Algorithm. 
This algorithm is performed by verifier with the 
inputs  are  gpk,  a  target  signature  σ,  and  the  message 
  ∈ {0,1}∗. The signatureσ  is verified as follows: 
Signature  check:  check  whether  σ  is  valid  or  not  by 
using SPK X as follows: 
a.  Re-derive     
 ,   
 ,   
 ,   
 as: 
   
  =
 (  ,  )
    ( ,  )
     ( ,  )   ( , )   . 
 (  ,  )
 (  , ) 
  
, 
   
  =
 
  
  
  ,   
  =
 
  
     ,   
  =
 
      
     . 
 
b.  Re-derive the challenge ′ ∈    
∗  as: 
   =    ℎ(gpk, ,   ,  ,   ,   ,   
 ,   
 ,   
 ,   
 ). 
If    =  ′,the signature is valid, otherwise signature 
is invalid. 
 
Phase 4: Tracing   
The  input  of  this  algorithm  are  gpk,  the  traced 
signatureσ, message M, and the tracing secret key tsk. 
The Tracing Manager traces and identifies the signer as 
follows: 
a.  Verify  the  traced  signature  by  using  the  above 
Verify algorithm. 
b.  If the signature is valid, compute     =    /     , using 
the tracing key  tsk = ( ). 
c.  Output i. 
 
4.4Efficiency and Security Consideration 
To  confirm  the  better  efficiency  of  the  proposed 
scheme,  we  give  the  efficiency  comparison  of  Sign 
algorithm  and  Verify  algorithm,  excluding  Join-related 
and Open-related parts. Table 1 shows the comparison of 
the  computation  costs.  As  the  overhead,  the  proposed 
scheme  needs  slightly  more  pairing  computation  and 
exponentiation  on  pairing  computation.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  exponentiation  on  G1  is  smaller  than  [2]. 
However,  the  computation  cost  on  GT  and  pairing  are 
more  expensive  than  the  computation  cost  on  G1.  This 
comparison  result  means  that  the  proposed  scheme  is 
slightly more overhead than in [2], since the number of GT 
and pairing computations is higher.In the Sign algorithm 
of proposed scheme, the number of GT computation is 4 
and pairing computation is also 4, while in the previous 
scheme  [2]  only  consumes  3  GT    computation  and  3 
pairing computation. Meanwhile, the Verify algorithm in 
the proposed scheme consumes 6 GT computation and 5 
pairing computation, whereas in the previous scheme [2] 
consumes 5 GT  computation  and  4  pairing  computation 
(see Table 1).In this case, the overhead of each process of 
proposed scheme  comprises of  a GT  computation  and  a 
pairing computation comparing with previous scheme [2]. 
However, in our proposed scheme has an advantage to be 
easier  implemented  for  common  authentication  system, 
since  we  providedthe  additional  secret  components, 
(  ,  ,  ),  which  are  used  along  with  the  main  secret 
component of user    .Secret key      is formed from user 
secret  key    
   when  the  user  registering  himself  to  the 
Key Issuer Manager which is embedded in his user secret 
key  part    =       
 
.   Upon  proving  the  validity  of 
   =       
 
, GM embeds his secret key    
    into the user 
secret  key  component     = (       
  
) /(    )   along 
with his own secret key    . Hence, the part of user secret 
key,    = (        
 
   
  
) /(    ) = (        ) /(    ) , 
where     =   
  +   
  . In addition, this mechanism provides 
more secure authentication process than previous scheme 
[2]. 
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of computation costs of Sign and 
Verify algorithm. 
 
 
Scheme  Computation cost of Sign algorithm 
Computation cost of Verify algorithm 
[2]  9 (  )+ 3   + 3 (  ) 
8 (  )+ 5   + 4 (  ) 
Proposed 
scheme 
7 (  )+ 4   + 4 (  ) 
6 (  )+ 6   + 5 (  ) 
Note: 
E(G1): computation of exponentiation on G1 component. 
GT: computation on pairing. 
E(GT): computation of exponentiation on pairing. 
 
 
5. Performance Measurement 
In this section, we present the experiment results to 
show the efficiency of the proposed scheme. 
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We  measured  the  performance  of  our  proposed 
scheme in a desktop PC. The specification of PC is shown 
in Table 2. Table 3 shows the time comparison of signing, 
verification  and  opening  algorithm  between  previous 
scheme [2] and our proposed scheme. 
 
Table 2. Specification of H/W used in experiment. 
 
Specification of  Remarks 
Software 
O/S 
CPU 
RAM 
gcc-4.4, gmp-5.1.0, pbc-lib-0.5.12 
Ubuntu Linux kernel-2.6.35 
Intel Core i5 3.20GHz 
2GB 
 
Overall  the  total  authentication  time  of  our 
proposed scheme  takes about 80 ms, while in previous 
scheme  [2]  is  only  about  60  ms.Table  1shows  thatthe 
process  ofsigningandverificationhas  a  difference  of  one 
computation  on  ,  whereas  computationaltimeon    is 
about  7ms.So  the  totaltimedifference  of     and  the 
pairing preparationis only about 15ms. 
The  Opening  algorithm  takes  the  highest  cost, 
since the Opening algorithm consists of signature check 
(verification)  and  the  computation  of tracing  the  user’s 
identity (see Section 4.2 and 4.3). 
 
Table 3.Comparison of computation time of Keygen, Sign, 
Verify and Open algorithm. 
 
Time  Scheme [2] 
(ms) 
Proposed scheme 
(ms) 
Keygen  119.13  137.18 
Signing  21.52  35.24 
Verification  36.92  49.96 
Opening  74.84  79.67 
 
6. Conclusion 
We  have  presented  a  light-weight  group  signature 
scheme for the implementation of secure and anonymous 
communication protocols in the wireless networks which 
is  suitable  for mobile devices,  wireless sensor  network 
devices, or other embedded system devices. Our proposed 
group  signature  was  constructed  from  the  BBS  short 
signature scheme withthe total time of authentication is 
only 80ms in the current condition of desktop PC. 
 
7. Future Works 
Our future works include the implementation of the 
proposed  scheme  into  wireless  mobile  devices  and  its 
investigation,  the  implementation  of  secure  and 
anonymous  communication  protocol  on  the  online 
transaction  scenarios,  and  the  further  improvement  of 
group signature scheme. 
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